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It goes without saying that the explanation of wage behaviour is of paramount
importance in any endeavour to bring out the longer-run properties of a
macroeconomic model. One decade ago Skott took a closer look at the wage
relations of the Danish macroeconometric models ADAM and SMEC in order to
unveil some of their important long-run properties. His analysis led him to
conclude that none of them contained a theoretically well-defined structural (or
natural) level of unemployment, contrary to what was believed and routinely
asserted by their constructors and users. Moreover, Skott claimed that the wage
and price dynamics (or more generally: the supply side) of these models of the
Danish economy could simply be captured by "a traditional, old-fashioned
Phillips curve with a trade off between unemployment and inflation, in the short
as well as in the long run" (cf. Skott (1996), pp. 61-62; my translation).
Skott's analysis did not pass unchallenged. Somewhat hesitatingly it was
conceded that the wage relations of ADAM and SMEC did not, strictly speaking,
imply any structural (or NAIRU) level of unemployment. However, Skott's
contention that the supply side of these models could be reduced to an
old-fashioned Phillips curve was outright dismissed: thus, in several rejoinders
Smidt argued that Skott's Phillips curve conclusions did not rest on ADAM or
SMEC but rather on a highly stylized framework which did not capture the
detailed supply side structure and properties of both models (cf. Smidt (1996),
(1997)). In particular, Smidt made an effort to show that in ADAM, at least, the
long-run effect of lowering the unemployment rate permanently would not make
inflation move up any traditional, stable long-run Phillips curve (as held by
Skott) but would rather leave inflation unaffected (Smidt (1996), p.292)
2.
Curiously enough it went totally unnoticed that this very denial of a trade off
between unemployment and inflation in ADAM did actually bolster up Skott's
argument, in the sense that it implied the most favourable link between
unemployment and inflation one can possibly conceive of: if true it amounted to
the notion of a horizontal long-run Phillips curve.
Be that as it may, models as of today are obviously not exactly as they were ten
years ago, and to a varying degree all Danish models have been revised in the
light of new data, new areas of application and ongoing theoretical discussion
and development. One could therefore ask whether there is anything in Skott's
argument and conclusion which still applies to the most recent vintages of Danish
macromodels, or whether time has rendered his analysis obsolete and irrelevant.
It is exactly this type of question I set out to answer in this paper. To some extent
2
2  The same conclusion is also explicitly stated in the full documentation of ADAM from 1996 which is
still in force (cf. DS (1996), p.124)
1 I am indebted to Bjarne Brendstrup, Jørgen Drud Hansen, Jørgen Ulff-Møller Nielsen and to Peter
Skott for comments on a previous draft of this paper. Needless to say, I am solely responsible for any
ambiguity, obscurity or even outright mistake which may remain it can (therefore) be seen as a kind of update of Skott's original analysis, even
though the mode of reasoning as well as the scope will be quite different.
More specifically, it is the purpose of the paper to lay bare the
unemployment-inflation nexus and also, as far as possible, the long-run
relationship between unemployment and the wage share (or the real wage)
inherent in recent versions of the MONA model (developed by the Danish central
bank) and the SMEC model (built by The secretariat of The economic Council),
respectively
3. Section 2 will be devoted to an analysis of the wage and price
dynamics implied by the MONA model of the Danish economy. The much larger
section 3 focuses on the implications of the wage and price dynamics embedded
in the SMEC model. The concluding comments in section 4 also include a brief
comparison of some steady-state properties of MONA and SMEC.
2. The wage- and price dynamics of MONA
2.1 The wage relation in MONA 
Quite recently, the Danish central bank has launched a lucidly written
documentation of its macroeconomic model MONA (cf. NB (2003) and Smidt
(2004)). In this model, as in probably most other macroeconomic models, wage
behaviour is endogenized through a kind of wage Phillips curve explaining the
rate of change of the nominal wage (and not the level of the nominal wage, let
alone the real wage level). The wage relation in MONA does not, allegedly,
derive from any particular theoretical framework
4, and in this sense it can
therefore be said to be ad hoc
5. Simplifying slightly it can be written as follows
6:
(1) dlogw = m1 $dlogPc +m2 $dlog(P/Pc)+f(u,....) Øf/Øu < 0
3
6 cf. NB (2003), p.8
5 This is definitely not meant as a disapproval and does not, in itself, disqualify MONA. Invoking a
more or less sophisticated theoretical framework in empirical modelling sometimes amounts, on closer
inspection, to little more than pompous but hollow rhetoric  
4 cf. NB (2003), p.79
3 The reason why this investigation has left out a corresponding analysis of the influential  ADAM
model (jointly developed and used by Statistics Denmark and the Ministry of Finance) is mainly a
matter of (limited) space. Distilling the full-fledged model to an analytically tractable, but still
satisfactory stylization is a relatively more demanding business in the case of ADAM, it seems (even
though it should still be possible). Adding an explicit analysis of ADAM would, perhaps, even be a
waste of space: according to Smidt  "MONA has a close kinship with the most prevalent model in
Denmark, ADAM [...] the most important difference being that MONA is a model on quarterly data
(whereas ADAM is a model on yearly data)."  (Smidt (2004), p.85; my translation) As usual, nominal wage inflation
7 is assumed to be negatively affected by the
unemployment rate u. Consumer price inflation   is, as commonly seen, dlogPc
assumed to affect wage inflation directly; but it also enters the wage equation in a
more subtle way, since the difference between producer price inflation 
 is assumed to exert a (positive) dlogP and consumer price inflation dlogPc
influence upon nominal wage inflation (the idea being, allegedly, that relatively
favourable producer prices may increase the wage offered to employees
8). The
wage equation in MONA also contains the replacement ratio as well as the change
of the working day length as explaining variables, but since these variables play
no role at all for the reasoning in the following pages, they have been suppressed
in (1). It is important to note, vis-à-vis the subsequent account of the SMEC
model, that the share of wages or
9 the real wage is conspicuous by its absence in
MONA. It will soon become clear how much the omission of this relatively
"modern" feature of wage equations contributes towards simplifying and
shortcutting the analytical exposition of MONA's wage and price dynamics.
Quite conventionally, consumer price inflation is defined here as a weighted
average of domestic (producer) price inflation
10   and  imported inflation  dlogP
(the exchange rate adjusted foreign rate of inflation equal, in turn, to  dlogEP&
 ): dlogE+dlogP&
(2) dlogPc h ' $dlogEP& +(1−')$dlogP
Combining (1) and (2) readily yields
(3)  dlogw =( m1 −' $ (m1 −m2)) $dlogP +( ' $(m1 − m2)) $dlogEP& + f(u,...)
         h $ dlogP + $ dlogEP& + f(u,....)
Obviously, dynamic homogeneity in the wage relation requires that (+)=1
(reflecting, in turn, that  ). With a view to the actually estimated parameter m1 = 1
values I shall assume, in my general exposition of MONA, that    0 <( +)<1.
4
10For reasons of tractability, I will not distinguish between various concepts and measures of domestic
inflation, such as the rate of change of producer price versus the price of value added/the implicit
GDP-deflator. This simplification is probably of only minor importance, and in any case it is totally
immaterial whenever steady-state properties are being focused on. Apart from this, in MONA the term
producer price does in fact seem to be measured by the GDP deflator for the private sector except
mining and agriculture etc. (cf. Hansen (1998))   
9 For simplicity, the level of labour productivity will be treated as a constant in this paper. One can
therefore talk interchangeably about the wage share and the real wage. For the rest of the paper I shall
stick to the first term. 
8 ibid., p.79 and also Hansen (1998), where logP/Pc  is associated to the wedge between the producer
and consumer real wage. This wedge is also a feature of the wage relation in ADAM  
7 For brevity I shall renege, in the following, on full precision by omitting the prefix nominal 2.2 Implications in terms of the Phillips curve
2.2.1 Some provisos
The GDP-deflator (the price level P) has not, allegedly, been modelled explicitly
in MONA: this model contains no behavioural relation showing, as a starting
point, the formation of the GDP-deflator. Rather it is the other way round: it is
the prices of the components of demand which are modelled directly, and the
GDP-deflator then follows implicitly from a set of national accounting identities
(cf. NB (2003), pp.87-89). Even without an explicit GDP-equation at hand, it
might be possible to offer a stylized picture of what such an implicitly defined
equation would look like. However, I have refrained from trying to do so in this
sketch of MONA. This has several implications. In the first place, the absence of
an explicit price equation prevents me from deriving the short-run Phillips curve
in MONA. Secondly, it prevents me from exploring the real wage and wage share
implications of this model. As will become clear in a moment, the (forced)
neglect of these important aspects does not, however, render the analysis futile.
Even without an explicitly stated price mechanism it is possible, in the case of
MONA, to derive important long-run and steady-state properties of the model:
5
Figure 1: Phillips curves and the steady state relation 
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LP [dlogw = dlogP; dlogEP* = dlogEP* ]
12.2.2 The unemployment-inflation nexus for a given imported inflation: the
long-run Phillips curve
As seen, the level of the wage share plays no role for the wage dynamics in
MONA. But whatever its level it must, by definition, be stable in a long-run
equilibrium. I.e., in a long-run equilibrium, and for given labour productivity,
(4) dlogw = dlogP
If this condition is grafted upon (3), inflation is easily expressed as
(5) dlogP = 1
1− $[$dlogEP& + f(u,...)] 0 <  < 1
I will refer to the relation between inflation and unemployment for a given level
of imported inflation, and given stability of the wage share, as the long-run
Phillips curve. It is worthwhile noting that this curve has been derived here
without any reference at all to an underlying price mechanism or -dynamics. The
feature that makes this possible is simply the absence of the wage share in the
wage relation (1). This is what enables us to determine long-run inflation
recursively from only the wage dynamics (in conjunction with the long-run
condition (4)). 
It is easy to see that the slope of this long-run Phillips curve will be finite even if 
 should happen to be equal to 1 (implying, as we know, dynamic (+)
homogeneity in the wage relation). It is also clear from (5) that a change in the
level of imported inflation will make the curve shift. However, it is only if 
 that the shift will be one for one: if  , an increase in imported (+)=1 (+)<1
inflation by, say, one percentage point will imply an upward shift of the curve by
less than 1 percentage point.
In figure 1 the curves labelled LP illustrate this long-run Phillips curve for
different levels of imported inflation. It is easy to show that wage inflation will
exceed price inflation (and hence that the wage share will be increasing) below
the relevant LP curve and vice versa
11. Depending on the unspecified underlying
price mechanism, this wage share dynamics might still impinge upon the price
dynamics, even though it does not affect the nominal wage dynamics. Whatever
happens to the wage share, however, long-run inflation at any level of
unemployment is still just given by (5).
2.2.3 The steady-state employment-inflation nexus 
6
11More specifically, from (3) and (5) one can easily calculate that dlogω = dlogw - dlogP =
(1-α)[LP-dlogP], where LP indicates long-run inflation given by (5) In a steady state it is not sufficient that the wage share is stable. In addition we
require that employment and hence the real exchange rate be stable. Real
exchange rate stability implies, in turn, that 
(6) dlogP = dlogEP&
If this condition is merged with the long-run Phillips curve (5) (which only
assumes a stable wage share) we eventually arrive at the steady-state association
between unemployment and inflation:
(7)          dlogP = 1
1−(+ ) $f(u,...) = 1
1−m1
$f(u,...) 0 <( +)<1
In figure 1 the curve labelled SS depicts this steady-state relationship. Obviously,
it will be positively sloped if (and only if)  . If  had been equal to (+)<1 (+)
1 (implying, as we know, dynamic homogeneity in the wage relation), the
steady-state employment-inflation relation would obviously have been be vertical
(at the unemployment level  ). It is also seen that the long-run Phillips u = f−1(0)
curve (5) coincides with (or, indeed, constitutes) the steady-state relation (7)
between employment and inflation if   is equal to zero. In this case imported 
inflation would vanish from the wage relation and hence from the long-run
Phillips curve.
2.3 What do these Phillips curves look like?
Let us now figure out what empirics have to say about the analytical expressions
we have developed above: in MONA the parameters   have been m1, m2 and Øf/Øu
estimated as 0.3402, 0.0849 and -0.9523 , respectively
12. If   (the weight of '
imported goods in the consumer price index) is put equal to 1/3, this implies that
the slope of the long-run Phillips curve implied by MONA would be equal to 
(8) Ø(dlogP)/Øu = 1
1− $Øf/Øu = 1
1−0.2551 $(−0.9523) l −1.28
Thus, taking MONA at face value means that a decline of unemployment by one
percentage point would imply, for any given level of imported inflation, a
long-run increase in domestic inflation by almost 1.3 percentage point.
I have not found it worthwhile trying to identify the true value of   in MONA '
(nor, subsequently, in SMEC). After all, this parameter and hence its true value is
7
12In NB (2003) the coefficient to the rate of unemployment is given as 0.002374; this number, however,
refers to inflation per quarter and not inflation per year. The number adduced above is just the
corresponding number per year (cf. NB (2003), p.81) without any bearing at all on steady-state relations incorporating the requirement
(6) (cf. (7) above, where   is totally absent)
13. The (slope of the) long-run Phillips '
curve does, however, depend on  , and putting   equal to 1/3 may rightly seem ' '
somewhat arbitrary. But it is easy to get a rough idea of the significance of   for '
this slope: with   equal to 0.50, 0.25 and 0, respectively, the slope would change '
from 1.28 to 1.21, 1.32 and 1.44. Thus, it does not seem to be terribly sensitive to
the value of  . '
Given the estimated value of the underlying parameter m1 , the slope of the
steady-state nexus between employment and inflation in MONA becomes equal to
(9)      Ø(dlogP)/Øu =− 1
1−(+) $ Øf/Øu =− 1
1−0.3402 $0.9523 l −1.44
I.e., MONA implies a steady-state association between employment and inflation
which is far from being vertical. One interpretation of this steady-state result
would be to say that an increase in imported inflation by 1 percentage point
would, if MONA were taken at face value, tend to make unemployment shrink by 
 percentage point in the (very) long run. 1/1.44 l 0.69
The fathers of MONA have stated that
"A vertical Phillips curve, characterized by a one for one impact from price [-inflation]
increase  to wage [-inflation] increase
14 has not been estimated. The estimated impact
from an increase in price [-inflation] is less than one for one and, consequently,
MONA's Phillips curve is not vertical but sloping."
 15 (NB (2003), p.77; my translation;
brackets added by me)  
Whatever "the estimated impact from an increase in price [-inflation]" is taken to
mean, our analytical expressions are fully in accordance with these remarks:
whether it means   (the sum of the inflation coefficients in (3)) or just the (+)
coefficient α to domestic inflation (cf. (3)), it makes no difference: in MONA
even   is less than 1, and therefore not just the long-run Phillips curve, but (+)
even the steady-state nexus between employment and inflation will be
non-vertical
16. This conclusion concerning MONA as of today seems to be fully in
line with Skott's conclusions concerning ADAM and SMEC one decade ago.
8
16Even though, as noted, there are large similarities between MONA and ADAM according to Smidt
(2004), this property of MONA does not carry  over to ADAM (in so far as this model entails a
horizontal long-run Phillips curve (cf. Smidt (1996)))
15However, the author(s) do certainly not take this to mean that unemployment can be permanently
lowered by accepting a higher level of domestic inflation (sustained by higher imported inflation
brought about by continuous, "creeping" depreciations)
14The discussion below brings out clearly that a partial one for one impact from price inflation to wage
inflation is not generally a sufficient condition for getting a vertical Phillips curve
13The steady-state nexus is totally independent of ϕ, the weight attached to imported inflation in
consumer price inflation: this weight is, of course, immaterial whenever domestic inflation is equal to
imported inflation, and this property is part of the concept of a steady state3. The wage- and price dynamics of SMEC
3.1 The wage- and price relations
The full SMEC  model has been documented repeatedly over the past decades (cf.
DØRS (1990, 1994, 1998, 1999)), and actually an even more recent version of
the wage formation in SMEC has been documented in a chapter of the half-yearly
publication Danish Economy
17 by The Secretariat of The Economic Council
(DØRS) that appeared in the spring of 2002. It is the wage relation presented in
this report which is the point of departure of the following analysis, and my term
SMEC 02 simply refers to a SMEC model where this most recent wage relation
from 2002 has taken the place of the previous wage relation.
3.1.1 The wage relation
Actually, the Secretariat of The Economic Council (DØRS) has presented not just
one, but two alternative wage relations in DØRS (2002). The formal structure is
the same, but the meaning attached to one of the variables differs and there are,
accordingly, two separate estimations. The new wage relation looks as follows
18:
(10) dlogw = s1 $dlogPc + s2 $dlogEP& +f(u,...)−$ * Øf/Øu < 0
This wage relation contains several novel features vis-à-vis its predecessors:
wage inflation is seen to depend, as in MONA and for similar reasons, directly on
consumer price inflation. In earlier versions of SMEC, wage inflation was
affected directly by GDP-price inflation rather than by consumer price inflation.
According to DØRS, there is an important empirical link between foreign
nominal wage growth and domestic wage inflation, and for this reason the
exchange rate adjusted foreign wage inflation has now been added as a separate
argument. In the stylization presented here imported inflation captures dlogEP&
this novel element. Quite as usual, of course, lower unemployment increases, eo
ipso, wage inflation. Unlike MONA, the replacement ratio does not (any longer)
appear as an explaining variable in SMEC's wage relation. Fully in line with
MONA, however, a change in the working day length affects wage inflation in
SMEC 02, but for the same reason as before this argument has been suppressed in
(10). According to DØRS, it is also a novel feature of the wage relation that the
wage share now enters as an explaining variable (cf. DØRS (2002), p.160)
19. The
9
19This is somewhat surprising, however: after all, it seems easy to verify that the wage share/real wage
has been an integral part of the relation describing wage inflation in all versions of SMEC from 1990
and onwards (cf. DØRS (1990), p.61; DØRS (1994), p.94ff.; DØRS (1999), p.15. In table 1 below I
have reported the estimated coefficient to the wage share in the wage relation of previous versions of
18 ibid., p.156
17cf. DØRS (2002)idea behind including this argument could be, for instance, that a higher actual
wage share relative to any aspirations concerning the wage share that employees
might hold tends to dampen wage inflation. 
If the definition of consumer price inflation (2) is grafted upon (10), the wage
relation appears in a reduced form which makes clear that it is the inclusion of
the wage share in SMEC which constitutes the only (but crucial) real difference
between the wage relation in MONA and SMEC 02:
(11) dlogw = s1(1−') $dlogP+(s1 $ ' +s2)$ dlogEP& + f(u,...)−$*
  = $ dlogP+ $dlogEP& + f(u,...)−$*
  = $ dlogP+ $

 $dlogEP& + F(u,...) −* ØF/Øu < 0
where     can naturally be  h s1 $ (1− '),  h s1 $' +s2. F(u,...) h (1/)$f(u,. . . )
interpreted as a term capturing wage share aspirations of employees. In SMEC 
 is specified linearly as   (a detail of no significance until f(u, ...) f(u, ...)=) −!$u
section 3.3 below). Obviously, the wage relation exhibits dynamic homogeneity
if and only if  (reflecting, in turn, that ). As will be seen later (+)=1 (s1 +s2 = 1)
on, in one version of SMEC the wage equation does indeed display dynamic
homogeneity. In an alternatively proposed wage equation, however, α and γ add
up to less than one. For these reasons I shall assume, in my general analysis of
SMEC, that  .  0 <( +) [ 1
3.1.2 The price relation
In Skott's original analysis (Skott (1996), (1997)) he argued that the steady-state
Phillips curves in SMEC as well as in ADAM would be positively sloped, quite
irrespective of whether prices were determined as a mark up on unit wage costs
only or as a mark up on unit wage and imports costs. In the analysis leading to
this result he combined the wage dynamics with the wage share implications of
mark up pricing and with the requirement of a zero balance of payment in the
steady state
20. His analysis of SMEC (and ADAM) did not, however, take into
10
20This very additional requirement enabled him, effectively, to determine the wage share occuring in
the wage equation: since the balance of payments constraint implies a positive relationship between
employment and the real exchange rate, and since mark up pricing, in turn, implies a negative
relationship between the real exchange rate and the wage share (in the case with prices determined as a
mark up on unit wage and import costs), the steady state wage share will be negatively associated to
employment   
SMEC). In 1990, for example, DØRS explained that "If, in a certain year, the [product] real wage [...] is
below the general level, this will contribute to larger wage increases in the following year. According
to the model, a relatively low product real wage in 1986 was an important explanation of high
[nominal] wage increases in 1987." (DØRS (1990), p.61 and, identically, DØRS (1994), p.97; my
translation and italics)  account the possibility that the occurrence of an explicitly stated price dynamics
might also, in addition to the wage dynamics, have a say with regard to the
inflation and wage share outcome in the steady state. This neglect was totally
warranted, it seems. After all, just a few years earlier the authors of SMEC had
stated, unmistakably, that "Prices are determined, in the short as well as in the
long run, by a markup on unit wage costs" (DØRS (1994), p.14; my italics). 
Whatever may have been the case a decade ago, SMEC as of today does in fact
seem to contain an explicitly stated price dynamics allowing a distinction
between the short- and long-run behaviour of prices. This is only what one
should expect, since the model would be peculiarly asymmetric if it included a
fully articulated wage dynamics but remained, at the same time, entirely silent on
the dynamics of prices. In a relatively recent analysis of the price formation in the
SMEC model, DØRS has modelled the price dynamics of the fundamental
GDP-deflator in the following, only slightly stylized
21 way:
(12) dlogP = $dlogw+∏ $ (log* −log*&)
  l $ dlogw+(∏/*&)$(*−*&) h $dlogw+$(* −*&)
This price dynamics is almost completely analoguous to the wage dynamics
encountered in (11), where wage inflation was seen to depend on the gap between
the wage share target of employees and the actual wage share. Analogously, price
inflation is here posited as depending, in part, on the gap between the actual wage
share and the wage share target ω∗ of firms (which, in turn, must obviously be
closely related to the profit share price target or the markup target of firms).
Wage inflation was seen to depend, in part, on price inflation. Similarly, price
inflation is seen here to depend, simultaneously, on wage inflation. 
Obviously, dynamic homogeneity in the price relation requires that δ be equal to
one. Now, if prices in SMEC are really determined, as stated by DØRS, by a
markup on unit wage costs, it means that δ = 1
22. The account of the price
dynamics given in DØRS (1998)
23 suggests, however, that δ is not equal to, but
less than one. In the subsequent concrete analysis of SMEC 02.1 and SMEC 02.2  
(in section 3.4 below) I will look at the implications of either assumption
concerning δ. In the general discussion of the  structure of the SMEC model I
therefore just impose the restriction  .  [ 1
3.2 Implications in terms of the Phillips curve and the wage share curve
11
23 cf. DØRS (1998), p.31 ff.
22Since Skott's calculation of SMEC's Phillips curve seems to rest on the same assumption, it can be
captured by putting δ = 1 in our structure  
21The short way from the original price dynamics in DØRS (1998) to the stylized account of it in (12)
has been set out in detail in Harck (2005), p.9 and p.16  3.2.1 The short-run Phillips curve: the unemployment-inflation nexus for a given
wage share and for a given imported inflation 
Let us first derive the short-run Phillips curve, by which I have in mind the
relation between unemployment and domestic inflation implied by the wage- and
price dynamics, given that the wage share - a state variable - is (still) fixed, and
also given the level of imported inflation
24. This relationship easily emerges from
(12) in conjunction with (11):
12
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Figure 2: Phillips curves and the steady state relationship between unemployment
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Accordingly, the slope of any short-run Phillips curve can be written as
(14)   Ø(dlogP)/Øu = 1
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Figure 3: Phillips curves and the steady state relationship between unemployment and, 






SS[dlogw = dlogP = dlogEP*]I have illustrated the short-run Phillips curves (13) by the curves labelled SP in
figure 2.1. Obviously, a higher level of imported inflation would make the
short-run Phillips curve shift upwards. The shift will be one for one if 
. Given the restrictions on these parameters it means that the shift $(+)=1
will be one for one if the wage dynamics as well as the price dynamics display
dynamic homogeneity. If  δ and/or   are less than one, the upward shift will (+)
obviously be less than one for one.
Similarly, a changing wage share will make the short-run Phillips curve shift
(save for a special case). It is easily seen that  . sign[Ø(dlogP)/Ø*] = sign[−]
I.e., a higher wage share will shift the short-run Phillips curve upwards (and
hence, in itself, make the level of inflation increase) if βδ< λ (and vice versa).
This criterion can be given a quite neat interpretation: according to (12), an
increase in the wage share by, say, 1 per cent means, in itself, that price inflation
increases by λ percentage points. According to (11), however, it also means, in
itself, that wage inflation will go down by β percentage points, and according to
(12) price inflation will therefore decline by βδ percentage points on that
account. If the first direct effect dominates the last indirect effect, a higher wage
share must therefore imply, on a net basis, that inflation goes up (for any given
unemployment level). As will be seen later, in SMEC a higher wage share does
indeed imply, eo ipso, a net increase in the level of inflation. Figure 2-1 has in
fact been drawn accordingly: if, for instance, the wage share increases from 
, and given that imported inflation remains unchanged at  *1 to *D
, the corresponding short-run Phillips curve shifts upward as dlogEP& = dlogEP1
&
shown in figure 2-1 (and as explained in more detail in section 3.2.6 below).
3.2.2 The long-run wage share relation: the long-run unemployment-wage share
nexus for a given imported inflation
Needless to say, the dynamics of the nominal wage in (11) and of the price level
in (12) determine, in conjunction, the dynamics of the wage share. In fact, it is
possible to show
25 that, for a given level of unemployment and for any given
level of imported inflation, the wage share converges asymptotically towards a
certain stable level, and that this stable wage share level can be expressed as
26, 27
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27MONA's wage dynamics (1) could also, in principle, be combined with price dynamics à la (12). This
would actually lead to a steady-state relation between the wage share and unemployment similar to (but
simpler and more straightforward to derive) than (15). The crucial point is, however, that this way of
26cf. formula (7) in Harck (2004)
25For reasons of space I have refrained from showing the derivation of this and some subsequent results
explicitly. In Harck (2004) I explored a somewhat simpler structure (formally corresponding to the case
where γ = 0) and derived the various Phillips curves and wage share expression fully explicitly. The
easiest way to obtain the somewhat more complicated formulas here is through conclusion by analogy
from the results derived for this earlier model. (15) * = *& +  $

 $dlogEP& + F(u,...)−*& $ < 1
where       h
(1−)
(1−)+(1− )
Apart from the case where δ = 1, the long-run wage share at any given
unemployment level will be positively affected by the level of imported inflation
- provided, of course, that wage inflation is indeed affected by imported inflation
(i.e., if  ). In figure 2-2 the curves labelled LW display this relationship for  > 0
two different values of imported inflation. Each curve is simply a locus for wage
share stability in (1-u, ω)-space and can be thought of as the long-run relation
between employment and the wage share, given the specified level of imported
inflation.
3.2.3 The long-run Phillips curve
Since, for any given level of unemployment and imported inflation, the wage
share converges towards a stable level given by (15), it is possible to specify the
level of inflation corresponding to each point on this curve. By grafting (15) upon
(13), inflation along an LW-locus can be derived as
28 






 $dlogEP& +F(u,...))−*& $ < 1
It seems quite natural to interpret (16) as the long-run Phillips curve
corresponding to a given level of imported inflation. Evidently, if   this $ < 1
long-run Phillips curve has a finite slope. For any given level of imported
inflation it simply shows, at any level of employment, how large inflation will be
when the wage share has settled, eventually, at the stable value given by (15).
Obviously, a change in the level of imported inflation will make this long-run
Phillips curve shift, provided of course that wage inflation is affected by
imported inflation (i.e., if  . However, closer scrutiny of (16) easily reveals  > 0)
that only if the wage dynamics as well as the price dynamics display dynamic
homogeneity (i.e. only if   given the restrictions imposed on these $(+)=1,
parameters) will the shift will be one for one. If  δ and/or   are less than one, (+)
15
28cf. formula (8) in Harck (2004)
making the wage share endogenous would not modify any of our previous conclusions concerning
long-run and steady-state inflation and hence steady-state unemployment in MONA - simply because
the long-run Phillips curve is totally immune to the wage share in MONA. Incidentally, including a
price dynamics à la (12) would also make room for a short-run Phillips curve à la (13)  an increase in imported inflation by, say, one percentage point will shift the
long-run Phillips curve by less than one percentage point. In figure 2-1 the two
curves labelled LP illustrate the long-run Phillips curve for two different values
of imported inflation.
The slope of a long-run Phillips curve can be written as





In figure 2-1 this slope exceeds the slope of the short-run Phillips curve drawn
for a given wage share. But it could easily be lower: if, in itself, a higher wage
share tends to dampen inflation (which, as we have seen already, would be the
case if βδ > λ), the long-run increase in the wage share associated with higher
employment (except for the case where δ = 1) would tend, in the long run, to
dampen the increase in inflation - implying, in terms of geometry, a higher
short-run slope than long-run slope. Indeed, it is easy to verify that if βδ > λ (and
if δ < 1) - implying, as we know already, that a higher wage share will make the
short-run Phillips curve shift downwards - the slope of the short-run Phillips
curve given by (14) exceeds the slope of the long-run Phillips curve given by
(17) (and vice versa).
If   the wage share along the long-run Phillips curve is constant, and in this  = 1
case the slope of the long-run Phillips curve(s) therefore equals the slope of the
short-run Phillips curve(s). This is easily confirmed by (14) and (17).
3.2.4 The steady-state employment-inflation nexus
Being on a particular long-run Phillips curve corresponding to a certain level of
imported inflation implies that wage inflation is equal to price inflation. Hence it
implies stability of the wage share. But stability of the wage share is only one
criterion of a true steady state. An additional criterion is that domestic inflation
indicated by the long-run Phillips curve in question be equal to imported inflation
- and this condition is only met in one point on this particular long-run Phillips
curve. Thus, imposing the additional steady-state condition dlogP = dlogEP&
on the long-run Phillips curve (16) above enables us to specify a locus consisting
of all steady-state positions as






      $(+)<1
16The curve labelled SS in figure 2-1 illustrates this steady-state
employment-inflation nexus
29. 







It is easily seen that this nexus is positively sloped whenever  . If   $(+)<1
 (i.e., if the wage relation and, simultaneously, the price relation $(+)=1
display dynamic homogeneity) it is obviously vertical. It is easily seen that the
slope of this steady-state employment-inflation nexus is larger than the slope of
the long-run Phillips curve if  . If   it would correspond to a set up where  > 0  = 0
imported inflation were absent in the wage relation and therefore also in the
long-run Phillips curve (cf. (16)). In this case the long-run Phillips curve would
evidently coincide with (and hence constitute) the steady-state nexus between
employment and inflation; and the common slope would be a finite number
(compare (16) and (18)). In the most recent version of SMEC, however,   (the 
partial impact of imported inflation on wage inflation) is indeed positive, and
therefore the slope of the steady-state nexus now exceeds, unambiguously, the
slope of the long-run Phillips curve.
3.2.5 The steady-state employment-wage share nexus
Similarly, only one employment-wage share couple along any long-run wage
share curve pertaining to a given imported inflation is consistent with a full
steady-state equilibrium.The steady-state employment level can be thought of as
being singled out by the steady-state nexus between employment and inflation
(17) since, formally, this nexus can be interpreted as a relation showing
steady-state employment as a function of imported inflation. That is, by
combining (15) with (18) we finally obtain the steady-state relation between
employment and the wage share:
(20)           * = *& +
(1−)
(1−)+(1−(+)) $[F(u,...)−*&] $(+)<1
Obviously, the slope of this steady-state nexus exceeds, unambiguously, the slope
of the long-run nexus (15) if  . If the wage relation, but not the price relation,  > 0
displays dynamic homogeneity ( ), the steady-state nexus is seen to 1 =( +)>
coincide with the wage share target of wage earners F(u; ..). If, on the other hand,
the price relation but not the wage relation exhibits this property ( ), 1 =  >( +)
17
29It is a matter of taste - of semantic preference - whether this steady-state relationship should also be
referred to as (some kind of) a Phillips curve the steady-state nexus is seen to be given, simply, by the wage share target of
firms ω∗.
3.2.6 How are the curves interrelated? A brief example
Looking at a little example may be the best way to get a feeling of the way this
host of Phillips- and wage share curves are interrelated. Thus, assume that the
economy is initially in a steady state corresponding to point A in figure 2, and
that unemployment then somehow decreases from u' to u''. As long as the wage
share is still (or: if the wage share were) constant (and equal to ω1 ) in the short
run, inflation would increase corresponding to the distance between B and C in
figure 2-1. If it were possible to sustain this lower unemployment level at an
unchanged level of imported inflation, the wage share would gradually increase
corresponding to the move from C to D in figure 2-2. This wage share increase,
in turn, would make the short-run Phillips curve shift upwards, since it has been
assumed here that a wage share increase is, eo ipso, inflation-driving; and this
would mean an additional impetus to inflation corresponding to the distance
between C and D in figure 2-1. However, given an unchanged imported inflation
equal to  , point D would obviously not be consistent with the notion of a dlogEP1
&
steady state: at this level of imported inflation only the unemployment level u'
(corresponding to point A) can be sustained in the long run. If, however,
imported inflation were (permanently) increased to, say,  , the lower dlogEP2
&
unemployment level u''' could be sustained (provided, of course, that the model is
still taken at face value): such an increase in imported inflation would imply an
upward shift of the long-run wage relation to LW[  ...]. This, in turn, dlogEP2
&
would mean an upward shift of the long-run Phillips curve to LP[  ...]. dlogEP2
&
Conceptually, the new steady-state position on this long-run Phillips curve could
then be derived as the intersection in point F between this shifted LP-curve and
the horizontal line at the level   in figure 2-1. Having identified the new dlogEP2
&
steady-state level of unemployment (equal to u''') in this way would finally
enable us, in terms of our geometrical set up, to plot the new steady-state position
F on the shifted curve LW [ ...].  dlogEP2
&
3.3 How do the Phillips- and the wage share relations look in SMEC?: A
concrete view
So far I have been trying to bring out the Phillips curves and the wage share
relations implied by the SMEC model in fairly general terms, without any
reference to the values of the parameters which have been estimated. Now time
has come for putting some flesh on the bones: I will now dress the framework
developed so far with the estimated parameter values in order to see how these
18curves would look in concrete terms, according to this recognized model of the
Danish economy. In particular, I will be interested in uncovering whether the
finding of a non-vertical long-run Phillips curve in MONA carries over to SMEC,
or whether the long-run relation between unemployment and inflation can in
some sense be said, unconditionally, to be vertical. According to DØRS
"There is, generally, a widespread consensus that a temporary reduction in
unemployment can be achieved at the expense of a higher
30 inflation. However, the
typical result of economic models is that this possibility does not exist in the long run.
[...] Thus, there is no long-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation in these
models, or differently phrased: the long-run Phillips curve is vertical." (DØRS (2002),
p.139; my translation)
According to DØRS, SMEC has now been brought into agreement with this
consensus view:
"The new wage relation has, contrary to SMEC's previous wage relation, the property
that the long-run level of unemployment does not depend on the level of inflation.
According to this relation, a simultaneous [and identical] increase in Danish prices
[price inflation] and foreign wages [imported inflation] will, in itself, make Danish
wages [wage inflation] increase by the same amount - and leave long-run
unemployment unchanged." (ibid., p.160; my translation, italics and added brackets).
31
As touched upon earlier, SMEC 02 comes with not just one, but with two
alternative wage relations, even though both relations are formally captured by
(10). This is due to the fact that DØRS attaches two quite different meanings to
the unemployment variable u: in the first case, denoted by me as SMEC 02.1, u
stands for the difference between actual unemployment and trend unemployment
(obtained mechanically by smoothing previous actual unemployment figures by
means of an HP-filter). In the alternative version, denoted by me as SMEC 02.2,
u simply refers to a properly chosen measure of actual unemployment.
As seen from table 1, the diverse interpretation of u within the same formal
structure makes quite a difference to at least some of the parameter estimates.
Allegedly, the alternative wage relation of SMEC 02.2  fares slightly better than
the wage relation of SMEC 02.1 in terms of the coefficient of determination
(R-square); but the difference is not statistically significant, and according to
DØRS both models meet standard tests concerning the statistical properties quite
satisfactorily (cf. DØRS (2002), pp.158-160).
However, even though purely statistical criteria do not allow one to discriminate
between the two SMEC versions, theoretical considerations may still provide
reasons for preferring one version rather than the other. I shall elaborate a little
on this in section 3.3.3 below.
19
31this seems to indicate that Skott's original Phillips curve proposition was accepted, eventually, but
also that it is now seen as being outdated
30DØRS probably means "at the expense of  low(er) inflation" or "by incurring the cost of higher
inflation"  In SMEC 94 and 99, wage inflation is directly affected by GDP price inflation and not by
consumer price inflation. Implicitly, therefore, these previous versions of SMEC correspond to a
case where ϕ = 0 and s2= 0 (implying that α = s1 (1-ϕ) = s1 and  γ = s1 ϕ + s2 = 0).  As noted in
the text, the non-zero value of ϕ adduced for SMEC 02 is not an estimate but has been arbitrarily
stipulated. As in MONA steady-state inflation is again totally independent of the weight attached
to imported inflation in consumer price inflation. Hence, putting ϕ  equal to 1/3 in our numerical
exercises has no bearing at all on our results concerning the steady state. As for δ, the source is
DØRS (1998), p.31.  δ cannot be inferred from the documentation of SMEC 94 (DØRS (1994)).
λ has also been inferred from DØRS (1998), p.31, and is actually equal to an estimated parameter
λ' over the long-run value of firms' wage share target repeatedly assumed by DØRS (cf. equation
(12) and, in more detail, Harck (2005))
0,46 0,96 0,59
 or 1
0,19 0,64 0,19 1/3 0,55 0,29 SMEC 02.2
0,46 0,96 0,59
 or 1
0,33 0,73 0,28 1/3 0,58 0,42 SMEC 02.1
0,76 0,96 0.59  0,24 0 0,52 0 0 0,52 SMEC 99
1,06 0,22 0 0,58 0 0 0,58 SMEC 94
!(= −$ ØF/Øu) λ δ β γ α ϕ s2 s1
Table 1:  parameter values in SMEC
3.3.1 SMEC 02.1
Let us first look at SMEC 02.1 (corresponding to the case where the u-variable is
conceived of and measured as the deviation between actual unemployment and a
mechanically determined trend unemployment). As seen from table 1, the
underlying estimates of   imply that   is equal to one in this case
32. s1 and s2 (+)
However, whatever value chosen for  ,   is less than one. '  h s1 $ (1− ')
Obviously, the implication of this with regard to the various long-run and
steady-state relations depends crucially on the value of δ (cf. (15), (16), (18) and
(20)).
(1) Assuming (implicitly) that δ = 1
DØRS seems to take it for granted that the steady-state nexus between
unemployment and inflation is vertical if and only if the wage equation displays
dynamic homogeneity, i.e. if  . According to the analysis above, (+)=1
however, this is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for making it
20
32Strictly speaking,  (α+γ) is approximately equal to 1 (cf. DØRS (2002), Boks III.2, p.156): to 3
decimals, α and γ add to 1.007. Therefore it is not entirely clear whether dynamic homogeneity of (11)
has been imposed on the estimation from the outset or whether the reported values are the outcome of
an unrestricted estimation. My calculations below rest on the assumption that they add to 1 precisely  vertical: it will only be vertical if  . To put it differently, DØRS' $(+) = 1
belief that SMEC 02.1 implies a vertical steady-state relationship between
unemployment and inflation seems to rest on the implicit assumption that δ = 1
33.
On this additional assumption it is definitely true that it would become vertical.
But even in this case, the long-run Phillips curve corresponding to a given
imported inflation would still have a finite slope. Given   = 1/3, this slope turns '
out to be equal to 0.63 (cf. figure 3-1)
34. I.e., a 1 percentage point lower
unemployment rate would in this case lead to an increase in inflation by about ½
percentage point in the long (as well as short
35) run, if the lower unemployment
rate could be sustained at an unchanged imported inflation.
If   , the long-run wage share relation coincides with the horizontal line  = 1
displaying firms' wage share aspirations (cf. figure 3-2): in this case the wage
share dynamics can be recursively determined by the price relation (12) alone,
and at any level of unemployment the wage share will converge towards the
target wage share ω∗ of firms, quite irrespective of the level of imported inflation
(cf. (15) and (20)). But only one point on this horizontal long-run relation
between unemployment and the wage share will be consistent with a steady state:
as the counterpart of the vertical steady-state relation between unemployment and
inflation the steady-state relation between unemployment and the wage share has
shrunk from a curve to the single point 
. (1−u&,*&),w h e r eu& h
u arg [F(u,...)=*&]
Of course, all this begs the question whether it is legitimate to invoke the implicit
assumption that δ = 1. As noted already, relatively recently DØRS has modelled
the price dynamics of the fundamental GDP-deflator by an equation virtually
identical to (12) and has reported estimates suggesting values of δ and λ equal to
0.59 and 0.96, respectively
36. If the implicit assumtion of δ = 1 is substituted by
this explicit piece of evidence, things change considerably:
(2) Assuming that δ < 1
Even though   is still (approximately) equal to 1,   now falls short (+) $(+)
of 1, implying that even the steady-state relationship between unemployment and
inflation would now exhibit a finite slope. With   in SMEC 02.1, a 1  = 0.59 < 1
percentage point lower unemployment rate would increase inflation by,
approximately, 1/3 percentage point in the short run with a still given wage share
(cf. table 2). For an unchanged level of imported inflation, this decline of
unemployment would mean a long-run increase in the wage share of,
21
36cf. DØRS (1998), p.31 and the note of table 1
35In this special case the short- and long-run Phillips curves coincide (cf. (13) and (16)),
34The case where (α+μ) = 1 > δ is captured, in principle, by figure 2: qualitatively, figure 2-1 and 2-2
correspond to versions of SMEC  where δ(α+μ) is less than 1. The specific slopes indicated in these
figures are referring to SMEC 02.2 with δ = 0.59 < 1 
33DØRS' claim quoted above is not restricted to this version of the model (SMEC 02.1)approximately, 1/4 percentage point (cf. table 3). This eventual wage share
increase, in turn, would mean that inflation would come up by roughly ½
percentage point in the long run (cf. table 2). This situation would evidently not,
however, be compatible with a steady state. Rather, in order to sustain a 1
percentage point lower unemployment rate, imported inflation (and therefore also
domestic inflation) would have to go up by rather more than 3 percentage points
(cf. table 2) which, in turn, would be associated with a wage share increase equal
to almost 1½ percentage points (cf. table 3).
3.3.2 SMEC 02.2
Let us now turn attention to the second version of SMEC supplied by DØRS.
Contrary to the wage relation of SMEC 02.1, the wage relation of SMEC 02.2
does not exhibit dynamic homogeneity:   turns out to be equal to 0.83 (cf. (+)
table 1). This means that even if we assume, in the same manner as DØRS seem
to do implicitly, that   would fall short of 1. Even in this case the  = 1, $(+)
steady-state relations would therefore exhibit finite slope.
(1) Assuming that δ = 1
If δ were really equal to 1, the long-run wage share (which would coincide with
the steady-state wage share) would be totally independent of the level of
unemployment (cf. table 3). This would mean that the slope of the short-run
Phillips curves would be equal to the slope of the long-run Phillips curve
corresponding to the same level of imported inflation (cf. (13) and (16)). Putting 
 equal to 1/3 once more, their common slope would be slightly less than 0.60, '
meaning that a 1 percentage point lower unemployment rate would trigger, in the
short as well as the long run, an increase in inflation of rather more than half a
percentage point (cf. table 2). This lower unemployment rate would obviously be
unsustainable as a steady state if imported inflation were unchanged. As seen
from table 2 it would almost take a 3 percentage point increase in imported
inflation (and hence domestic inflation) to make this lower unemployment rate
sustainable as a steady state (still provided, of course, that the model is taken at
face value).
(2) Assuming that δ < 1
All this applies a fortiori if, again, we discard the assumption that δ = 1 and take
into account, once more, DØRS' own previous empirical findings concerning δ
and λ: with δ = 0.59 < 1, a 1 percentage point lower unemployment rate would
now make inflation increase by approximately 1/3 percentage point in the short
run (i.e., for a still given wage share and for a given level of imported inflation).
And with δ being less than 1, the wage and price dynamics and hence the wage
22share dynamics would not leave the wage share unaffected but would trigger a
long-run wage share increase equal to roughly 1/4 percentage points, if the 1
percentage point lower unemployment rate were sustained in spite of an
unchanged level of imported inflation (cf. table 3). This long-run wage share
increase would mean, in turn, an upward shift of the short-run Phillips curve and
would imply that inflation would eventually have been elevated by half a
percentage point
37 (cf. table 2). Again, this situation would not be compatible
1,86  0.52   0.31   = 0.59 < 1
 2.77  0,57 0,57  = 1  02.
2
3,21 0.53  0,31  = 0.59 < 1
0.63  0,63  = 1  02.
1
(18) (16) (13) algebraic expression
SMEC
1,44 1,28
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curve (for a given
wage share and for
a given level of
imported inflation)
Table 2:  slope of the various Phillips curves
0,79 0,22  = 0.59 < 1
0 0  = 1
SMEC 02,2
1,37 0,23  = 0.59 < 1
0  = 1
SMEC 02,1
(20) (15) algebraic expression
steady-state
employment-wage
share nexus (for a






share nexus (for a
stable wage share
and for a  given
level of imported
inflation)
Table 3:  slope of the various wage share relations
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37Note, in tables 2 and 3, that the slope of the short- and long-run Phillips curves and of the long-run
nexus between  employment and the wage share are largely similar, but that the slope of the
steady-state relationship are, on the other hand, quite different with the notion of a steady-state equilibrium: to make the 1 percentage point
lower unemployment rate sustainable would now take a slightly less than 2
percentage points increase in the level of imported inflation (cf. table 2). This, in
turn, would imply that the wage share would go up by somewhat less than 1
percentage point (cf. table 3).
Therefore, in the light of SMEC 02.2 and even of SMEC 02.1 (with δ < 1) Skott's
original Phillips curve proposition does not seem to have lost any relevance. In
fact, the net effect of new data, of thorough revisions of the model and of the
higher degree of sophistication implied by having taken the price dynamics
explicitly into account has been rather moderate, it seems: one decade ago Skott
found that, according to SMEC, a 1 percentage point lower unemployment rate
would trigger, in the long run, an increase in inflation by 2.50 percentage points
(cf. Skott (1996), p.65). The corresponding numbers
38 we are reporting now, ten
years later, are quite close to this result: they range from 1.86 to 3.21 percentage
points and are thus of the same order of magnitude.
3.3.3 SMEC 02.1 or SMEC 02.2 : which version should be preferred?  
Above I suggested that theoretical considerations might lead one to prefer one of
the two versions of SMEC, even though they are claimed to fare equally well, by
and large, if envisaged from a purely statistical perspective. Let me now briefly
explain the reason one might have for opting in favour of SMEC 02.2: The reason
simply is that whatever merits SMEC 02.1 may be claimed to possess in terms of
econometric propertie, it may, perhaps, nevertheless be said to suffer from a
certain logical flaw. This is particularly easily seen in the case invoked by DØRS,
where δ is implicitly equal to 1 (but the argument also applies to the case where δ
< 1):
Since   it is easily seen from (18) (or, perhaps better, from (16)) that (+)= = 1
steady-state unemployment is given as
(21)   uSS = u& h
u




 −*& = 0




 −*& = 0 = 1
! $[)−$ *&]
as well as firms' wage share target   are (independent) parameters, and the ), *&
model does not impose any constraint implying that  . I.e., *& be equal to )/
there is nothing assuring a steady-state value of u equal to zero. However, in
24
38Since imported inflation did not enter the wage equation of SMEC 94, the long-run Phillips curve
simply coincides with the steady-state nexus between unemployment and inflation in Skott's analysisSMEC 02.1  u does not signify the unemployment rate but the gap between
unemployment and trend unemployment (contrary to the case in SMEC 02.2, it
will be recalled). Hence, in SMEC 02.1 (21) describes the steady-state value of
the gap between unemployment and trend. And this has to be zero: one cannot
conceive of a steady state with a systematically positive or negative deviation
between actual and trend unemployment. This would evidently render the very
concept of a steady state totally meaningless. In short, the problem is that there is
nothing at all in SMEC 02.1 making sure that the steady-state value of u singled
out by (21) will necessarily be zero; but given the meaning of u in SMEC 02.1, it
has to be zero if economic meaningfulness is to be retained.
The argument (against SMEC  02.1, or in favour of SMEC 02.2) can be given a
slightly different twist, if we just look at the wage relation (10) and refrain from
taking into account the explicit error correction formulation (12) of the price
dynamics: if the steady-state requirement dlogw = dlogP = dlogEP& = dlogPc
is simply imposed on the wage relation (10), the steady state is easily seen to
imply a value of u equal to    if   in uSS =( 1/!) $[) −$*] (s1 +s2) h (+)=1
SMEC 02.1. Again, the very notion of a steady state requires that the steady-state
gap between unemployment and trend unemployment be equal to zero. Once
more, however, there is nothing in the model assuring this result: the model
contains no constraint implying that the wage share is necessarily equal to   in )/
the steady state. DØRS has estimated   as 0.233 and 0.332, respectively, in ) and 
SMEC 02.1. Potentially, the wage share could certainly equal, precisely,
0.233/0.332 = 0.70. But there is no mechanism in SMEC 02.1 guaranteeing that
the wage share takes on this particular value in the steady state. Put differently,
SMEC 02.1 could easily imply a non-zero steady value of   and hence a uSS
non-zero gap between actual and trend unemployment in the steady state. This
seems to be a contradiction in terms. 
4. Concluding comments: a brief comparison of MONA and
SMEC
The preceding pages have shown that it is considerably harder to establish a
tractable analytical account of the wage and price dynamics of SMEC than of
MONA. It is easy to identify the reason for this: in SMEC, wage inflation depends
(negatively) on the actual wage share, whereas wage inflation in MONA is totally
immune to the actual wage share. If the price dynamics were ignored altogether
and the wage share were treated as a fully exogenous variable (much in keeping
with Skott's original approach), this conceptual difference between SMEC and
MONA would reduce to an unimportant formalism and would not, in itself, make
25the analysis of the wage and price dynamics in SMEC relatively more
complicated. However, in our exposition of SMEC the wage share appears as an
endogenous state variable, and this is what makes the attempt at unravelling the
long-run properties of SMEC a somewhat more complicated business.
To some extent, the considerable difference in the level of complexity implied by
the presence or absence of the wage share term in the wage relation is associated
with a difference in the results. For example, the slope of the long-run Phillips
curve in MONA has been shown to be equal to 1.28, whereas the corresponding
slope is slightly less than half this number in both versions of SMEC, quite
irrespective of the value of δ. There is also a conspicuous difference in the
relative magnitude of the slope of the steady-state relation between
unemployment and inflation: in MONA, the steady-state slope is only slightly
bigger than the slope of the long-run Phillips curve. In SMEC, however, the slope
of the steady-state nexus between unemployment and inflation exceeds the slope
of the long-run Phillips curve by a factor ranging from about  3½ to about 6. This
means, for instance, that the slope of this steady-state nexus is more than twice as
large in SMEC 02 than in MONA if SMEC 02.1 with δ < 1 is taken as the most
congenial version of the SMEC model.
In some other respects, however, the implications of MONA and SMEC are quite
similar. If, instead, SMEC 02.2 with δ < 1 is considered the most relevant
representative of SMEC 02, important steady-state properties turn out to be rather
similar: in this case the slope of the steady-state relation between unemployment
and inflation will be only 1.86
39 in SMEC and thus largely identical to the
corresponding slope (= 1.45) according to MONA. Or, to put it slightly
differently: if MONA and SMEC 02.2 (with δ < 1) are both taken at face value,
the steady-state implication of a permanent change of imported inflation by, say,
1 percentage point, would be largely identical. Needless to say, domestic inflation
would go up by the same amount, and the steady-state rate of unemployment
would decline by, respectively,   and  percentage (1/1.44) l 0.69 (1/1.86) l 0.54
points.
26
39With δ = 1 the steady-state slope between unemployment and inflation would be 2.77 instead.
Incidentally, this number is quite close to 2.50, the value identified by Skott (cf. Skott (1996), p.65) References
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